Files
next-ai-draw-io/lib/ssrf-protection.ts
T
Dayuan Jiang 458d8050cc refactor(providers): one record per provider, one place for the key-and-URL decision (#988)
Every fact about a provider lives in one record in lib/providers.ts (SDK kind,
credential kind, env var prefix, default URL, picker group, four-language
notes, and a short model list for the six providers that cannot list models).
The thirteen tables keyed by provider name are gone. resolveEndpoint decides
whose key a call uses and where it goes; usesServerCredentials reads its
answer instead of mirroring getAIModel's branches; serverCredentialError holds
the server credential check once. The UI, the connection test and the routes
read the record's credential and sdk fields instead of comparing provider
names (44 such checks before, 6 after, in the admin panel's fixed-variable
branches).

Intended behavior changes: providers that can list their models have no
hand-written list; the settings dialog fetches the live list in the background
once credentials are entered for a provider without models and offers it
behind "Browse models". Azure has no placeholder default URL (old entries that
hold it still count as unset); the base URL field of Azure and of the new
"custom" OpenAI-compatible preset (CUSTOM_API_KEY, CUSTOM_BASE_URL) is
labelled required. The connection test answers 400 for an unknown provider
name; prototype names are refused everywhere. Provider lists in error messages
and the admin "add provider" dropdown follow the picker's order.

Also fixed, from before the refactor: the redirect guard drops x-access-code
on cross-origin redirects, and edgeOneEndpoint accepts the Origin header only
when it matches Host or X-Forwarded-Host.

Verification: a behavior snapshot of getAIModel's SDK factory calls and the
quota functions over 25 providers, 22 client override shapes and 9 server
environments (5843 rows), recorded on the old code and unchanged apart from
the intended changes; 752 unit tests, 65 provider e2e tests, tsc, biome,
next build. Reviewed by five models from one brief; their findings and the
resulting fixes are recorded in docs/plans/2026-10-provider-refactor.md.
2026-10-12 21:31:03 +09:00

203 lines
7.1 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) protection utilities
*/
import { lookup } from "node:dns/promises"
/**
* Check if an IP address (IPv4 or IPv6) belongs to a private/internal range.
* Works for both user-supplied literal IPs and DNS-resolved addresses.
*/
function isPrivateIp(ip: string): boolean {
const addr = ip.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
// IPv6
if (addr.includes(":")) {
if (addr === "::1" || addr === "::") return true
// unique-local (fc00::/7) and IPv4-mapped (::ffff:0:0/96)
if (
addr.startsWith("fc") ||
addr.startsWith("fd") ||
addr.startsWith("::ffff:")
) {
return true
}
// link-local (fe80::/10)
const linkLocal = addr.match(/^fe([0-9a-f]{2}):/)
if (linkLocal) {
const high = parseInt(linkLocal[1], 16)
if (high >= 0x80 && high <= 0xbf) return true
}
return false
}
// IPv4
const ipv4Match = addr.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/)
if (ipv4Match) {
const [, a, b] = ipv4Match.map(Number)
if (a === 10) return true // 10.0.0.0/8
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true // 172.16.0.0/12
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true // 192.168.0.0/16
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true // 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local)
if (a === 127) return true // 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
if (a === 0) return true // 0.0.0.0/8
if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true // 100.64.0.0/10 (CGNAT, used by some cloud internal networks)
}
return false
}
/**
* String-only check against well-known private hostnames and literal IPs.
* Fast path that avoids a DNS lookup for obvious cases.
*/
function isPrivateHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
const host = hostname
.toLowerCase()
.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
.replace(/\.$/, "")
if (
host === "localhost" ||
host === "127.0.0.1" ||
host === "::1" ||
host === "::"
) {
return true
}
if (host === "169.254.169.254" || host === "metadata.google.internal") {
return true
}
if (
host.endsWith(".local") ||
host.endsWith(".internal") ||
host.endsWith(".localhost")
) {
return true
}
// Literal IP supplied directly in the URL
return isPrivateIp(host)
}
/**
* Check if URL points to private/internal network.
* Blocks: localhost, private IPs, link-local, AWS metadata service.
*
* Resolves the hostname via DNS and validates every returned address, so
* public-looking names that map to internal IPs (e.g. "127-0-0-1.sslip.io")
* are caught even though they pass the string-only check.
*/
export async function isPrivateUrl(urlString: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
const url = new URL(urlString)
const hostname = url.hostname
// Fast path: obvious string matches and literal IPs.
if (isPrivateHostname(hostname)) return true
// Resolve DNS and reject if any address is private.
const stripped = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").replace(/\.$/, "")
const addresses = await lookup(stripped, { all: true })
return addresses.some(({ address }) => isPrivateIp(address))
} catch {
return true // Invalid URL or DNS failure - block it
}
}
/**
* Whether private URLs are allowed (defaults to true)
* Set ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=false to block private URLs
* Read per call so admin-panel changes apply without restart
*/
export function allowPrivateUrls(): boolean {
return process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS !== "false"
}
/** A redirect the guard below refused; its text is safe to show */
export class RedirectRefusedError extends Error {
constructor(message = "Redirects are not allowed for custom base URLs") {
super(message)
this.name = "RedirectRefusedError"
}
}
const MAX_REDIRECTS = 5
// Dropped when a redirect goes to another origin: those fetch drops, the
// key headers of providers that do not use Authorization (Anthropic,
// Google, Azure) and this site's access code (EdgeOne's function checks it)
const CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = [
"authorization",
"proxy-authorization",
"cookie",
"x-api-key",
"x-goog-api-key",
"api-key",
"x-access-code",
]
/**
* A fetch for requests to a base URL the client chose. With private URLs
* blocked, a public URL could still redirect the request to an internal
* host, so redirects are refused. With private URLs allowed but the quota
* on (DYNAMODB_QUOTA_TABLE), a request to a private address counts as the
* server's: a public URL's redirects are followed only to public addresses,
* or it could reach the server's own network uncounted. Undefined otherwise.
*/
export function redirectGuardedFetch(): typeof fetch | undefined {
const blockAll = !allowPrivateUrls()
if (!blockAll && !process.env.DYNAMODB_QUOTA_TABLE) return undefined
return async (input, init) => {
let url = input instanceof Request ? input.url : String(input)
let next = init
// A request to a private address already counts as the server's
let startsPrivate: boolean | undefined
for (let hop = 0; hop <= MAX_REDIRECTS; hop++) {
const response = await fetch(url, { ...next, redirect: "manual" })
const location = response.headers.get("location")
if (response.status < 300 || response.status >= 400 || !location) {
return response
}
if (blockAll) throw new RedirectRefusedError()
startsPrivate ??= await isPrivateUrl(url)
const from = new URL(url)
url = new URL(location, url).toString()
if (!startsPrivate && (await isPrivateUrl(url))) {
throw new RedirectRefusedError(
"Redirects to private addresses are not allowed",
)
}
// The rest as fetch itself does it. Another origin gets no
// credentials (the user's key, EdgeOne's cookies)
const headers = new Headers(next?.headers)
if (new URL(url).origin !== from.origin) {
for (const name of CREDENTIAL_HEADERS) headers.delete(name)
}
next = { ...next, headers }
// 303, and 301 or 302 after a POST, go on as a GET without the
// body
const method = (next.method ?? "GET").toUpperCase()
if (
response.status === 303 ||
((response.status === 301 || response.status === 302) &&
method === "POST")
) {
for (const name of [
"content-type",
"content-length",
"content-encoding",
"content-language",
"content-location",
]) {
headers.delete(name)
}
next = { ...next, method: "GET", body: undefined }
}
}
throw new RedirectRefusedError("Too many redirects")
}
}