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Author SHA1 Message Date
Dayuan Jiang 18a20aa1ca feat(api): count the quota by the CDN's client IP and refuse direct calls (#956)
Two optional settings for deployments behind a CDN such as Cloudflare.

CLIENT_IP_HEADER names the header that holds the visitor's real IP
(cf-connecting-ip on Cloudflare). The per-IP daily quota used the first
X-Forwarded-For entry, which visitors can set to anything, so a made-up
IP on every request got a fresh quota.

ORIGIN_SECRET makes proxy.ts refuse /api requests whose X-Origin-Secret
header does not match. The CDN adds the header, so a call that skips the
CDN, and could fake the IP header, gets 403. Pages are not checked, which
keeps health checks on / working.

Both are unset by default, and nothing changes then.
2026-10-06 10:32:43 +09:00
4 changed files with 101 additions and 6 deletions
+10
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@@ -163,6 +163,16 @@ AI_MODEL=global.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929-v1:0
# Set to "false" to block private IPs, localhost, and internal hostnames
# ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=false
# Behind a CDN such as Cloudflare (Optional)
# The daily quota is counted per IP. By default the IP is the first
# X-Forwarded-For entry, which visitors can set to anything. Name the header
# your CDN fills with the visitor's real IP instead:
# CLIENT_IP_HEADER=cf-connecting-ip
# Then have the CDN add an X-Origin-Secret header with this value to every
# request. API calls without it get 403, so nobody can skip the CDN and fake
# the IP header above.
# ORIGIN_SECRET=a-long-random-string
# Self-hosted deployment (Optional)
# Self-hosted users may implement custom quota-management solutions,
# which triggers the client UI to display messages suggesting self-hosting or sponsorship.
+11 -2
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@@ -2,10 +2,19 @@
* Generate a userId from request for tracking purposes.
* Uses base64url encoding of IP for URL-safe identifier.
* Note: base64 is reversible - this is NOT privacy protection.
*
* The first X-Forwarded-For entry is whatever the visitor sent, so behind a
* CDN set CLIENT_IP_HEADER to the header it fills with the real IP (e.g.
* cf-connecting-ip), and ORIGIN_SECRET so requests that skip the CDN are
* refused (see proxy.ts).
*/
export function getUserIdFromRequest(req: Request): string {
const forwardedFor = req.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
const rawIp = forwardedFor?.split(",")[0]?.trim() || "anonymous"
const ipHeader = process.env.CLIENT_IP_HEADER
const rawIp =
(ipHeader
? req.headers.get(ipHeader)?.trim()
: req.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")?.split(",")[0]?.trim()) ||
"anonymous"
return rawIp === "anonymous"
? rawIp
: `user-${Buffer.from(rawIp).toString("base64url")}`
+17 -4
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@@ -27,9 +27,19 @@ function getLocale(request: NextRequest): string | undefined {
export function proxy(request: NextRequest) {
const pathname = request.nextUrl.pathname
// Skip API routes, static files, and Next.js internals
if (pathname.startsWith("/api/")) {
// With ORIGIN_SECRET set, API calls must come through the CDN that
// adds this header. A call straight to the origin could fake the
// CLIENT_IP_HEADER and get a fresh quota for every made-up IP.
const secret = process.env.ORIGIN_SECRET
if (secret && request.headers.get("x-origin-secret") !== secret) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Forbidden" }, { status: 403 })
}
return
}
// Skip static files and Next.js internals
if (
pathname.startsWith("/api/") ||
pathname.startsWith("/_next/") ||
pathname.startsWith("/drawio") ||
pathname.includes("/favicon") ||
@@ -58,6 +68,9 @@ export function proxy(request: NextRequest) {
}
export const config = {
// Matcher ignoring `/_next/` and `/api/`
matcher: ["/((?!api|_next/static|_next/image|favicon.ico).*)"],
// API routes (for ORIGIN_SECRET), and pages without `/_next/` assets
matcher: [
"/api/:path*",
"/((?!api|_next/static|_next/image|favicon.ico).*)",
],
}
+63
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@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
import { NextRequest } from "next/server"
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest"
import { getUserIdFromRequest } from "@/lib/user-id"
import { proxy } from "@/proxy"
const idFor = (ip: string) => `user-${Buffer.from(ip).toString("base64url")}`
afterEach(() => {
delete process.env.CLIENT_IP_HEADER
delete process.env.ORIGIN_SECRET
})
describe("getUserIdFromRequest", () => {
const req = new Request("http://localhost/api/chat", {
headers: {
"x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.9, 198.51.100.7",
"cf-connecting-ip": "198.51.100.7",
},
})
it("uses the first X-Forwarded-For entry by default", () => {
expect(getUserIdFromRequest(req)).toBe(idFor("203.0.113.9"))
})
it("uses CLIENT_IP_HEADER when set", () => {
process.env.CLIENT_IP_HEADER = "cf-connecting-ip"
expect(getUserIdFromRequest(req)).toBe(idFor("198.51.100.7"))
})
it("is anonymous when the configured header is missing", () => {
process.env.CLIENT_IP_HEADER = "cf-connecting-ip"
expect(
getUserIdFromRequest(new Request("http://localhost/api/chat")),
).toBe("anonymous")
})
})
describe("ORIGIN_SECRET", () => {
const call = (path: string, secret?: string) =>
proxy(
new NextRequest(`http://localhost${path}`, {
headers: secret ? { "x-origin-secret": secret } : {},
}),
)
it("lets every API call through when unset", () => {
expect(call("/api/chat")).toBeUndefined()
})
it("refuses API calls without the right header", async () => {
process.env.ORIGIN_SECRET = "s3cret"
for (const res of [call("/api/chat"), call("/api/chat", "wrong")]) {
expect(res?.status).toBe(403)
}
expect(call("/api/chat", "s3cret")).toBeUndefined()
})
it("leaves pages alone, such as the health check on /", () => {
process.env.ORIGIN_SECRET = "s3cret"
expect(call("/")?.status).toBe(307)
expect(call("/en")).toBeUndefined()
})
})