mirror of
https://github.com/DayuanJiang/next-ai-draw-io.git
synced 2026-10-03 16:27:47 +08:00
fix: resolve DNS before SSRF check and block redirects in parse-url
isPrivateUrl() did string-only hostname matching and never resolved DNS, so a public-looking name that maps to an internal IP (e.g. 127-0-0-1.sslip.io -> 127.0.0.1) passed the check while fetch/extract later resolved it and reached internal services (GHSA-wqcv-5qvx-vx75). - isPrivateUrl is now async: it keeps the fast string/literal-IP path, then resolves the hostname via DNS and rejects if any address is private. - parse-url now fetches the page itself with redirect: "error" and parses via extractFromHtml(), since article-extractor follows redirects internally and drops a redirect option, which allowed a public URL to 302 to an internal host. - Update validate-model call site to await; add regression tests.
This commit is contained in:
+33
-28
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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import { extract } from "@extractus/article-extractor"
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import { extractFromHtml } from "@extractus/article-extractor"
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import { NextResponse } from "next/server"
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import TurndownService from "turndown"
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import { isPrivateUrl } from "@/lib/ssrf-protection"
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@@ -31,21 +31,31 @@ export async function POST(req: Request) {
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// SSRF protection: parse-url has no use case for fetching internal
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// hosts, so private URLs are always rejected. ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS only
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// governs LLM provider baseUrl overrides (validate-model, chat).
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if (isPrivateUrl(url)) {
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if (await isPrivateUrl(url)) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: "Cannot access private/internal URLs" },
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{ status: 400 },
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)
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}
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const headController = new AbortController()
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const headTimeout = setTimeout(() => headController.abort(), 3000)
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// Fetch the page ourselves so we control redirect handling. The
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// article-extractor library follows redirects internally and ignores a
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// `redirect` option, which would let a public URL 302 to an internal
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// host and bypass the SSRF check above. `redirect: "error"` rejects any
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// redirect outright.
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const controller = new AbortController()
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const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {
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controller.abort()
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}, EXTRACT_TIMEOUT_MS)
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let html: string
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try {
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const headResponse = await fetch(url, {
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method: "HEAD",
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const response = await fetch(url, {
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headers: { "User-Agent": USER_AGENT },
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signal: headController.signal,
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redirect: "error",
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signal: controller.signal,
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})
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const contentType = headResponse.headers.get("content-type")
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const contentType = response.headers.get("content-type")
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if (contentType?.includes("application/pdf")) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{
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@@ -54,27 +64,15 @@ export async function POST(req: Request) {
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{ status: 422 },
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)
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}
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} catch (err) {
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console.warn(
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"HEAD pre-check failed, proceeding with extraction:",
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err,
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)
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} finally {
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clearTimeout(headTimeout)
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}
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// Extract article content with timeout to avoid tying up server resources
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const controller = new AbortController()
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const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {
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controller.abort()
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}, EXTRACT_TIMEOUT_MS)
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if (!response.ok) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: "Could not fetch URL content" },
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{ status: 400 },
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)
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}
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let article
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try {
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article = await extract(url, undefined, {
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headers: { "User-Agent": USER_AGENT },
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signal: controller.signal,
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})
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html = await response.text()
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} catch (err: any) {
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if (err?.name === "AbortError") {
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return NextResponse.json(
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@@ -82,11 +80,18 @@ export async function POST(req: Request) {
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{ status: 504 },
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)
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}
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throw err
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// Redirects are rejected with a TypeError ("failed to fetch" /
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// "unexpected redirect") when redirect: "error" is set.
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: "Could not fetch URL content" },
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{ status: 400 },
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)
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} finally {
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clearTimeout(timeoutId)
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}
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const article = await extractFromHtml(html, url)
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if (!article || !article.content) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: "Could not extract content from URL" },
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@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ export async function POST(req: Request) {
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}
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// SECURITY: Block SSRF attacks via custom baseUrl
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if (baseUrl && !allowPrivateUrls() && isPrivateUrl(baseUrl)) {
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if (baseUrl && !allowPrivateUrls() && (await isPrivateUrl(baseUrl))) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ valid: false, error: "Invalid base URL" },
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{ status: 400 },
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+93
-66
@@ -2,80 +2,107 @@
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* SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) protection utilities
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*/
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import { lookup } from "node:dns/promises"
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/**
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* Check if URL points to private/internal network
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* Blocks: localhost, private IPs, link-local, AWS metadata service
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* Check if an IP address (IPv4 or IPv6) belongs to a private/internal range.
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* Works for both user-supplied literal IPs and DNS-resolved addresses.
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*/
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export function isPrivateUrl(urlString: string): boolean {
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function isPrivateIp(ip: string): boolean {
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const addr = ip.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
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// IPv6
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if (addr.includes(":")) {
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if (addr === "::1" || addr === "::") return true
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// unique-local (fc00::/7) and IPv4-mapped (::ffff:0:0/96)
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if (
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addr.startsWith("fc") ||
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addr.startsWith("fd") ||
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addr.startsWith("::ffff:")
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) {
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return true
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}
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// link-local (fe80::/10)
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const linkLocal = addr.match(/^fe([0-9a-f]{2}):/)
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if (linkLocal) {
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const high = parseInt(linkLocal[1], 16)
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if (high >= 0x80 && high <= 0xbf) return true
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}
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return false
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}
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// IPv4
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const ipv4Match = addr.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/)
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if (ipv4Match) {
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const [, a, b] = ipv4Match.map(Number)
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if (a === 10) return true // 10.0.0.0/8
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if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true // 172.16.0.0/12
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if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true // 192.168.0.0/16
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if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true // 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local)
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if (a === 127) return true // 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
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if (a === 0) return true // 0.0.0.0/8
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}
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return false
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}
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/**
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* String-only check against well-known private hostnames and literal IPs.
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* Fast path that avoids a DNS lookup for obvious cases.
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*/
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function isPrivateHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
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const host = hostname
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.toLowerCase()
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.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
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.replace(/\.$/, "")
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if (
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host === "localhost" ||
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host === "127.0.0.1" ||
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host === "::1" ||
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host === "::"
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) {
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return true
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}
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if (host === "169.254.169.254" || host === "metadata.google.internal") {
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return true
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}
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if (
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host.endsWith(".local") ||
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host.endsWith(".internal") ||
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host.endsWith(".localhost")
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) {
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return true
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}
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// Literal IP supplied directly in the URL
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return isPrivateIp(host)
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}
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/**
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* Check if URL points to private/internal network.
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* Blocks: localhost, private IPs, link-local, AWS metadata service.
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*
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* Resolves the hostname via DNS and validates every returned address, so
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* public-looking names that map to internal IPs (e.g. "127-0-0-1.sslip.io")
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* are caught even though they pass the string-only check.
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*/
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export async function isPrivateUrl(urlString: string): Promise<boolean> {
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try {
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const url = new URL(urlString)
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// Strip a trailing dot so FQDN forms like "localhost." (which still
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// resolve to 127.0.0.1) cannot bypass the equality checks below.
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const hostname = url.hostname
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.toLowerCase()
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.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
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.replace(/\.$/, "")
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// Block localhost
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if (
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hostname === "localhost" ||
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hostname === "127.0.0.1" ||
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hostname === "::1" ||
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hostname === "::"
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) {
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return true
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}
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// Fast path: obvious string matches and literal IPs.
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if (isPrivateHostname(hostname)) return true
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// Block IPv6 unique-local (fc00::/7), link-local (fe80::/10),
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// and IPv4-mapped (::ffff:0:0/96) hosts.
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if (hostname.includes(":")) {
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if (
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hostname.startsWith("fc") ||
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hostname.startsWith("fd") ||
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hostname.startsWith("::ffff:")
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) {
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return true
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}
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const linkLocal = hostname.match(/^fe([0-9a-f]{2}):/)
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if (linkLocal) {
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const high = parseInt(linkLocal[1], 16)
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if (high >= 0x80 && high <= 0xbf) return true
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}
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}
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// Block AWS/cloud metadata endpoints
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if (
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hostname === "169.254.169.254" ||
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hostname === "metadata.google.internal"
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) {
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return true
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}
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// Check for private IPv4 ranges
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const ipv4Match = hostname.match(
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/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/,
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)
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if (ipv4Match) {
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const [, a, b] = ipv4Match.map(Number)
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if (a === 10) return true // 10.0.0.0/8
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if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true // 172.16.0.0/12
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if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true // 192.168.0.0/16
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if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true // 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local)
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if (a === 127) return true // 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
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}
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// Block common internal hostnames
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if (
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hostname.endsWith(".local") ||
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hostname.endsWith(".internal") ||
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hostname.endsWith(".localhost")
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) {
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return true
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}
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return false
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// Resolve DNS and reject if any address is private.
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const stripped = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").replace(/\.$/, "")
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const addresses = await lookup(stripped, { all: true })
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return addresses.some(({ address }) => isPrivateIp(address))
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} catch {
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return true // Invalid URL - block it
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return true // Invalid URL or DNS failure - block it
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}
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}
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@@ -1,21 +1,62 @@
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import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest"
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import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest"
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import { isPrivateUrl } from "@/lib/ssrf-protection"
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// Mock DNS so tests are deterministic and never hit the network.
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const lookupMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn())
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vi.mock("node:dns/promises", () => ({
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default: { lookup: lookupMock },
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lookup: lookupMock,
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}))
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describe("isPrivateUrl", () => {
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it("blocks private IPv6 URLs", () => {
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expect(isPrivateUrl("http://[::1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(isPrivateUrl("http://[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(isPrivateUrl("http://[::]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(isPrivateUrl("http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(isPrivateUrl("http://[fc00::1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(isPrivateUrl("http://[fd12:3456:789a::1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(isPrivateUrl("http://[fe80::1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(isPrivateUrl("http://[fe9f::1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(isPrivateUrl("http://[febf::1]/")).toBe(true)
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beforeEach(() => {
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lookupMock.mockReset()
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})
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it("allows public URLs", () => {
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expect(isPrivateUrl("https://example.com/article")).toBe(false)
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expect(isPrivateUrl("https://fc00.example.com/article")).toBe(false)
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it("blocks private IPv6 URLs (string-only fast path, no DNS)", async () => {
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://[::1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://[::]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://[fc00::1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://[fd12:3456:789a::1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://[fe80::1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://[fe9f::1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://[febf::1]/")).toBe(true)
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expect(lookupMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
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})
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it("blocks literal private IPv4 without DNS", async () => {
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://127.0.0.1/")).toBe(true)
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://10.0.0.5/")).toBe(true)
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://192.168.1.1/")).toBe(true)
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://169.254.169.254/")).toBe(true)
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expect(lookupMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
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})
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it("allows public URLs that resolve to public IPs", async () => {
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lookupMock.mockResolvedValue([{ address: "93.184.216.34", family: 4 }])
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("https://example.com/article")).toBe(false)
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})
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it("blocks public-looking hostnames that resolve to a private IP (DNS-rebinding-style bypass)", async () => {
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// e.g. 127-0-0-1.sslip.io resolves to 127.0.0.1
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lookupMock.mockResolvedValue([{ address: "127.0.0.1", family: 4 }])
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://127-0-0-1.sslip.io/")).toBe(true)
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})
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it("blocks when any resolved address is private", async () => {
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lookupMock.mockResolvedValue([
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{ address: "93.184.216.34", family: 4 },
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{ address: "10.1.2.3", family: 4 },
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])
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://mixed.example.com/")).toBe(true)
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})
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it("blocks when DNS resolution fails", async () => {
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lookupMock.mockRejectedValue(new Error("ENOTFOUND"))
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expect(await isPrivateUrl("http://does-not-resolve.example/")).toBe(
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true,
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)
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})
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})
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user