Files
next-ai-draw-io/lib/ssrf-protection.ts
T
dayuan.jiang c75f74a5a0 fix: what the third round broke, and the first batch's review
MCP preview after the server lost a session (it expired, or the MCP
process restarted):
- Every server state has an id, made when the state is created. The tab
  notices a new id even when the version numbers happen to match, and
  every push names the state it was based on, so one based on a lost state
  is refused, also when it comes before the tab's first poll (the server
  recovers the saved file first).
- The tab keeps the newest canvas XML, saved or not. When the server knows
  nothing (no file) or exactly what the tab last saved, the canvas wins and
  is saved, so edits made while the server was down are kept. Otherwise
  the server's diagram (an AI write the tab missed, a cleared document
  that was saved) is shown and the tab's copy goes to History.
- Late answers to an old state's push or poll are dropped; a failed push
  says the server is unreachable; Download as .drawio saves the canvas.

Settings and server:
- Saved providers this version does not know stay in storage with their
  keys, and sending no longer trips over them.
- The desktop "Ollama (Local)" preset with a key goes to local Ollama
  again; a server model's Ollama URL variable is read; the admin panel
  writes Ollama Cloud's URL for a key without one.
- Provider error texts show again in the desktop app and for EdgeOne.
- .env: a quoted value followed by a comment ending in a quote is read as
  dotenv reads it; unquoted values are unchanged.
- Desktop app: the next launch opens the port where a chat was last
  saved; a launch elsewhere that saves nothing does not move it, and a
  page with no chats lets the next launch try the other port once.
- The Test button no longer stays busy after another tab changed the key.
- A completed append_diagram is no longer undone by an earlier failed
  edit's preview; a file read once in vain is saved again once it is read
  or gone.

From the first batch's review:
- The admin panel's Test of an entry without a URL now tests the server's
  <P>_BASE_URL, where chat sends the entry's key; chat is unchanged (the
  first fix rerouted working setups).
- The model list ends downloads that are too large, accepts answers
  without a body, and keeps the "redirects are not allowed" explanation.
- A test covers the preview's History rendering.
2026-10-05 17:33:36 +09:00

142 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) protection utilities
*/
import { lookup } from "node:dns/promises"
/**
* Check if an IP address (IPv4 or IPv6) belongs to a private/internal range.
* Works for both user-supplied literal IPs and DNS-resolved addresses.
*/
function isPrivateIp(ip: string): boolean {
const addr = ip.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
// IPv6
if (addr.includes(":")) {
if (addr === "::1" || addr === "::") return true
// unique-local (fc00::/7) and IPv4-mapped (::ffff:0:0/96)
if (
addr.startsWith("fc") ||
addr.startsWith("fd") ||
addr.startsWith("::ffff:")
) {
return true
}
// link-local (fe80::/10)
const linkLocal = addr.match(/^fe([0-9a-f]{2}):/)
if (linkLocal) {
const high = parseInt(linkLocal[1], 16)
if (high >= 0x80 && high <= 0xbf) return true
}
return false
}
// IPv4
const ipv4Match = addr.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/)
if (ipv4Match) {
const [, a, b] = ipv4Match.map(Number)
if (a === 10) return true // 10.0.0.0/8
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true // 172.16.0.0/12
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true // 192.168.0.0/16
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true // 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local)
if (a === 127) return true // 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
if (a === 0) return true // 0.0.0.0/8
if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true // 100.64.0.0/10 (CGNAT, used by some cloud internal networks)
}
return false
}
/**
* String-only check against well-known private hostnames and literal IPs.
* Fast path that avoids a DNS lookup for obvious cases.
*/
function isPrivateHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
const host = hostname
.toLowerCase()
.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
.replace(/\.$/, "")
if (
host === "localhost" ||
host === "127.0.0.1" ||
host === "::1" ||
host === "::"
) {
return true
}
if (host === "169.254.169.254" || host === "metadata.google.internal") {
return true
}
if (
host.endsWith(".local") ||
host.endsWith(".internal") ||
host.endsWith(".localhost")
) {
return true
}
// Literal IP supplied directly in the URL
return isPrivateIp(host)
}
/**
* Check if URL points to private/internal network.
* Blocks: localhost, private IPs, link-local, AWS metadata service.
*
* Resolves the hostname via DNS and validates every returned address, so
* public-looking names that map to internal IPs (e.g. "127-0-0-1.sslip.io")
* are caught even though they pass the string-only check.
*/
export async function isPrivateUrl(urlString: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
const url = new URL(urlString)
const hostname = url.hostname
// Fast path: obvious string matches and literal IPs.
if (isPrivateHostname(hostname)) return true
// Resolve DNS and reject if any address is private.
const stripped = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").replace(/\.$/, "")
const addresses = await lookup(stripped, { all: true })
return addresses.some(({ address }) => isPrivateIp(address))
} catch {
return true // Invalid URL or DNS failure - block it
}
}
/**
* Whether private URLs are allowed (defaults to true)
* Set ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=false to block private URLs
* Read per call so admin-panel changes apply without restart
*/
export function allowPrivateUrls(): boolean {
return process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS !== "false"
}
/** A redirect the guard below refused; its text is safe to show */
export class RedirectRefusedError extends Error {
constructor() {
super("Redirects are not allowed for custom base URLs")
this.name = "RedirectRefusedError"
}
}
/**
* A fetch for requests to a base URL the client chose. With private URLs
* blocked, a public URL could still redirect the request to an internal
* host, so redirects are refused. Undefined when private URLs are allowed.
*/
export function redirectGuardedFetch(): typeof fetch | undefined {
if (allowPrivateUrls()) return undefined
return async (input, init) => {
const response = await fetch(input, { ...init, redirect: "manual" })
if (response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400) {
throw new RedirectRefusedError()
}
return response
}
}