Files
next-ai-draw-io/lib/ssrf-protection.ts
T
dayuan.jiang c24aae6de0 refactor(providers): one model factory for chat and the settings Test button
- getAIModel resolves credentials (client key, server env vars, the
  existing SSRF rules) and createModel builds the model by SDK. The
  provider-by-provider switch shrinks from 24 cases to the few that
  differ (lib/ai-providers.ts 1531 -> 1106 lines)
- /api/validate-model calls getAIModel instead of its own 24-case switch
  (503 -> 175 lines), which had drifted from the chat: it built Azure
  with createOpenAI, Kimi and MiMo with createOpenAI instead of
  createDeepSeek, and the official OpenAI endpoint with Chat Completions.
  A passing test now means the chat works
- Plain OpenAI-compatible providers (SiliconFlow, SGLang, ModelScope,
  GLM, Qwen, Qiniu, Novita, Atlas Cloud, EdgeOne, Doubao, MiniMax in
  OpenAI mode, AIHubMix on a custom URL) use @ai-sdk/openai-compatible,
  which reads reasoning_content, so their reasoning shows, and accepts
  SGLang's stream as is (its 95-line stream rewrite is gone).
  includeUsage keeps token usage for quotas. <think> tags in their text
  become reasoning (extractReasoningMiddleware)
- SGLang without a base URL used OpenAI's endpoint; it now defaults to
  http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1 like the Test button did
- Chat requests to a client base URL refuse redirects, as the Test
  button already did (redirectGuardedFetch moves to lib/ssrf-protection)
- The Test button streams like the chat (the ModelScope special case is
  gone), times out after 15 s, does not retry, asks the model to call a
  ping tool and warns when it answers without one, and tests all models
  at once. The time each test took shows on its check mark
- Unknown provider names are rejected with Object.hasOwn, and the error
  texts list providers from PROVIDER_INFO instead of hand-kept lists
2026-10-04 13:31:47 +09:00

134 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) protection utilities
*/
import { lookup } from "node:dns/promises"
/**
* Check if an IP address (IPv4 or IPv6) belongs to a private/internal range.
* Works for both user-supplied literal IPs and DNS-resolved addresses.
*/
function isPrivateIp(ip: string): boolean {
const addr = ip.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
// IPv6
if (addr.includes(":")) {
if (addr === "::1" || addr === "::") return true
// unique-local (fc00::/7) and IPv4-mapped (::ffff:0:0/96)
if (
addr.startsWith("fc") ||
addr.startsWith("fd") ||
addr.startsWith("::ffff:")
) {
return true
}
// link-local (fe80::/10)
const linkLocal = addr.match(/^fe([0-9a-f]{2}):/)
if (linkLocal) {
const high = parseInt(linkLocal[1], 16)
if (high >= 0x80 && high <= 0xbf) return true
}
return false
}
// IPv4
const ipv4Match = addr.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/)
if (ipv4Match) {
const [, a, b] = ipv4Match.map(Number)
if (a === 10) return true // 10.0.0.0/8
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true // 172.16.0.0/12
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true // 192.168.0.0/16
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true // 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local)
if (a === 127) return true // 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
if (a === 0) return true // 0.0.0.0/8
if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true // 100.64.0.0/10 (CGNAT, used by some cloud internal networks)
}
return false
}
/**
* String-only check against well-known private hostnames and literal IPs.
* Fast path that avoids a DNS lookup for obvious cases.
*/
function isPrivateHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
const host = hostname
.toLowerCase()
.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
.replace(/\.$/, "")
if (
host === "localhost" ||
host === "127.0.0.1" ||
host === "::1" ||
host === "::"
) {
return true
}
if (host === "169.254.169.254" || host === "metadata.google.internal") {
return true
}
if (
host.endsWith(".local") ||
host.endsWith(".internal") ||
host.endsWith(".localhost")
) {
return true
}
// Literal IP supplied directly in the URL
return isPrivateIp(host)
}
/**
* Check if URL points to private/internal network.
* Blocks: localhost, private IPs, link-local, AWS metadata service.
*
* Resolves the hostname via DNS and validates every returned address, so
* public-looking names that map to internal IPs (e.g. "127-0-0-1.sslip.io")
* are caught even though they pass the string-only check.
*/
export async function isPrivateUrl(urlString: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
const url = new URL(urlString)
const hostname = url.hostname
// Fast path: obvious string matches and literal IPs.
if (isPrivateHostname(hostname)) return true
// Resolve DNS and reject if any address is private.
const stripped = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").replace(/\.$/, "")
const addresses = await lookup(stripped, { all: true })
return addresses.some(({ address }) => isPrivateIp(address))
} catch {
return true // Invalid URL or DNS failure - block it
}
}
/**
* Whether private URLs are allowed (defaults to true)
* Set ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=false to block private URLs
* Read per call so admin-panel changes apply without restart
*/
export function allowPrivateUrls(): boolean {
return process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS !== "false"
}
/**
* A fetch for requests to a base URL the client chose. With private URLs
* blocked, a public URL could still redirect the request to an internal
* host, so redirects are refused. Undefined when private URLs are allowed.
*/
export function redirectGuardedFetch(): typeof fetch | undefined {
if (allowPrivateUrls()) return undefined
return async (input, init) => {
const response = await fetch(input, { ...init, redirect: "manual" })
if (response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400) {
throw new Error("Redirects are not allowed for custom base URLs")
}
return response
}
}