mirror of
https://github.com/DayuanJiang/next-ai-draw-io.git
synced 2026-10-12 20:49:53 +08:00
Two issues from before the provider refactor, found by its review. The redirect guard dropped Authorization, cookies and the providers' key headers when a redirect left the origin, but kept x-access-code, this site's own access code; it is dropped too now. edgeOneEndpoint took the request's Origin header as the site's address. Behind a proxy the request URL is the internal one and Origin is the site's, so Origin still wins, but only when its host matches Host or X-Forwarded-Host; a request carrying another site's Origin now gets the request's own origin, so the EdgeOne cookies and the access code never travel to that site.
203 lines
7.1 KiB
TypeScript
203 lines
7.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) protection utilities
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*/
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import { lookup } from "node:dns/promises"
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/**
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* Check if an IP address (IPv4 or IPv6) belongs to a private/internal range.
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* Works for both user-supplied literal IPs and DNS-resolved addresses.
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*/
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function isPrivateIp(ip: string): boolean {
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const addr = ip.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
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// IPv6
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if (addr.includes(":")) {
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if (addr === "::1" || addr === "::") return true
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// unique-local (fc00::/7) and IPv4-mapped (::ffff:0:0/96)
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if (
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addr.startsWith("fc") ||
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addr.startsWith("fd") ||
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addr.startsWith("::ffff:")
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) {
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return true
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}
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// link-local (fe80::/10)
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const linkLocal = addr.match(/^fe([0-9a-f]{2}):/)
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if (linkLocal) {
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const high = parseInt(linkLocal[1], 16)
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if (high >= 0x80 && high <= 0xbf) return true
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}
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return false
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}
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// IPv4
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const ipv4Match = addr.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/)
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if (ipv4Match) {
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const [, a, b] = ipv4Match.map(Number)
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if (a === 10) return true // 10.0.0.0/8
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if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true // 172.16.0.0/12
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if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true // 192.168.0.0/16
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if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true // 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local)
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if (a === 127) return true // 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
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if (a === 0) return true // 0.0.0.0/8
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if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true // 100.64.0.0/10 (CGNAT, used by some cloud internal networks)
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}
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return false
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}
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/**
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* String-only check against well-known private hostnames and literal IPs.
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* Fast path that avoids a DNS lookup for obvious cases.
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*/
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function isPrivateHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
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const host = hostname
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.toLowerCase()
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.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
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.replace(/\.$/, "")
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if (
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host === "localhost" ||
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host === "127.0.0.1" ||
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host === "::1" ||
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host === "::"
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) {
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return true
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}
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if (host === "169.254.169.254" || host === "metadata.google.internal") {
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return true
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}
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if (
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host.endsWith(".local") ||
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host.endsWith(".internal") ||
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host.endsWith(".localhost")
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) {
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return true
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}
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// Literal IP supplied directly in the URL
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return isPrivateIp(host)
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}
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/**
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* Check if URL points to private/internal network.
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* Blocks: localhost, private IPs, link-local, AWS metadata service.
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*
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* Resolves the hostname via DNS and validates every returned address, so
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* public-looking names that map to internal IPs (e.g. "127-0-0-1.sslip.io")
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* are caught even though they pass the string-only check.
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*/
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export async function isPrivateUrl(urlString: string): Promise<boolean> {
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try {
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const url = new URL(urlString)
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const hostname = url.hostname
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// Fast path: obvious string matches and literal IPs.
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if (isPrivateHostname(hostname)) return true
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// Resolve DNS and reject if any address is private.
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const stripped = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").replace(/\.$/, "")
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const addresses = await lookup(stripped, { all: true })
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return addresses.some(({ address }) => isPrivateIp(address))
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} catch {
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return true // Invalid URL or DNS failure - block it
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}
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}
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/**
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* Whether private URLs are allowed (defaults to true)
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* Set ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=false to block private URLs
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* Read per call so admin-panel changes apply without restart
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*/
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export function allowPrivateUrls(): boolean {
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return process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS !== "false"
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}
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/** A redirect the guard below refused; its text is safe to show */
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export class RedirectRefusedError extends Error {
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constructor(message = "Redirects are not allowed for custom base URLs") {
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super(message)
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this.name = "RedirectRefusedError"
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}
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}
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const MAX_REDIRECTS = 5
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// Dropped when a redirect goes to another origin: those fetch drops, the
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// key headers of providers that do not use Authorization (Anthropic,
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// Google, Azure) and this site's access code (EdgeOne's function checks it)
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const CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = [
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"authorization",
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"proxy-authorization",
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"cookie",
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"x-api-key",
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"x-goog-api-key",
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"api-key",
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"x-access-code",
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]
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/**
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* A fetch for requests to a base URL the client chose. With private URLs
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* blocked, a public URL could still redirect the request to an internal
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* host, so redirects are refused. With private URLs allowed but the quota
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* on (DYNAMODB_QUOTA_TABLE), a request to a private address counts as the
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* server's: a public URL's redirects are followed only to public addresses,
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* or it could reach the server's own network uncounted. Undefined otherwise.
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*/
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export function redirectGuardedFetch(): typeof fetch | undefined {
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const blockAll = !allowPrivateUrls()
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if (!blockAll && !process.env.DYNAMODB_QUOTA_TABLE) return undefined
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return async (input, init) => {
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let url = input instanceof Request ? input.url : String(input)
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let next = init
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// A request to a private address already counts as the server's
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let startsPrivate: boolean | undefined
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for (let hop = 0; hop <= MAX_REDIRECTS; hop++) {
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const response = await fetch(url, { ...next, redirect: "manual" })
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const location = response.headers.get("location")
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if (response.status < 300 || response.status >= 400 || !location) {
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return response
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}
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if (blockAll) throw new RedirectRefusedError()
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startsPrivate ??= await isPrivateUrl(url)
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const from = new URL(url)
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url = new URL(location, url).toString()
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if (!startsPrivate && (await isPrivateUrl(url))) {
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throw new RedirectRefusedError(
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"Redirects to private addresses are not allowed",
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)
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}
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// The rest as fetch itself does it. Another origin gets no
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// credentials (the user's key, EdgeOne's cookies)
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const headers = new Headers(next?.headers)
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if (new URL(url).origin !== from.origin) {
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for (const name of CREDENTIAL_HEADERS) headers.delete(name)
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}
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next = { ...next, headers }
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// 303, and 301 or 302 after a POST, go on as a GET without the
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// body
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const method = (next.method ?? "GET").toUpperCase()
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if (
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response.status === 303 ||
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((response.status === 301 || response.status === 302) &&
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method === "POST")
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) {
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for (const name of [
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"content-type",
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"content-length",
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"content-encoding",
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"content-language",
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"content-location",
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]) {
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headers.delete(name)
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}
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next = { ...next, method: "GET", body: undefined }
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}
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}
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throw new RedirectRefusedError("Too many redirects")
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}
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}
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