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https://github.com/DayuanJiang/next-ai-draw-io.git
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* fix: resolve DNS before SSRF check and block redirects in parse-url isPrivateUrl() did string-only hostname matching and never resolved DNS, so a public-looking name that maps to an internal IP (e.g. 127-0-0-1.sslip.io -> 127.0.0.1) passed the check while fetch/extract later resolved it and reached internal services (GHSA-wqcv-5qvx-vx75). - isPrivateUrl is now async: it keeps the fast string/literal-IP path, then resolves the hostname via DNS and rejects if any address is private. - parse-url now fetches the page itself with redirect: "error" and parses via extractFromHtml(), since article-extractor follows redirects internally and drops a redirect option, which allowed a public URL to 302 to an internal host. - Update validate-model call site to await; add regression tests. * fix: preserve charset detection and block CGNAT range in parse-url SSRF fix Follow-up to the multi-reviewer review of the SSRF fix: - Restore charset handling lost when switching from extract() to response.text(): non-UTF-8 pages (Shift_JIS/GBK/EUC/Big5, common on CJK sites this project targets) decoded as mojibake. Now read the body as bytes, detect charset from Content-Type / <meta charset>, and decode with TextDecoder before extractFromHtml. - Wrap extractFromHtml in try/catch: it throws (not returns null) on empty/non-HTML bodies, which previously surfaced as a 500 instead of the intended 400. - Add 100.64.0.0/10 (RFC 6598 CGNAT) to isPrivateIp; it is routable inside some cloud internal networks and was a residual SSRF target. - Add tests for CGNAT, its boundaries, 0.0.0.0, and DNS-resolved IPv6.
118 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript
118 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) protection utilities
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*/
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import { lookup } from "node:dns/promises"
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/**
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* Check if an IP address (IPv4 or IPv6) belongs to a private/internal range.
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* Works for both user-supplied literal IPs and DNS-resolved addresses.
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*/
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function isPrivateIp(ip: string): boolean {
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const addr = ip.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
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// IPv6
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if (addr.includes(":")) {
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if (addr === "::1" || addr === "::") return true
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// unique-local (fc00::/7) and IPv4-mapped (::ffff:0:0/96)
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if (
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addr.startsWith("fc") ||
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addr.startsWith("fd") ||
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addr.startsWith("::ffff:")
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) {
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return true
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}
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// link-local (fe80::/10)
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const linkLocal = addr.match(/^fe([0-9a-f]{2}):/)
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if (linkLocal) {
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const high = parseInt(linkLocal[1], 16)
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if (high >= 0x80 && high <= 0xbf) return true
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}
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return false
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}
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// IPv4
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const ipv4Match = addr.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/)
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if (ipv4Match) {
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const [, a, b] = ipv4Match.map(Number)
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if (a === 10) return true // 10.0.0.0/8
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if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true // 172.16.0.0/12
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if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true // 192.168.0.0/16
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if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true // 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local)
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if (a === 127) return true // 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
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if (a === 0) return true // 0.0.0.0/8
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if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true // 100.64.0.0/10 (CGNAT, used by some cloud internal networks)
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}
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return false
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}
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/**
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* String-only check against well-known private hostnames and literal IPs.
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* Fast path that avoids a DNS lookup for obvious cases.
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*/
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function isPrivateHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
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const host = hostname
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.toLowerCase()
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.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")
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.replace(/\.$/, "")
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if (
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host === "localhost" ||
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host === "127.0.0.1" ||
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host === "::1" ||
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host === "::"
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) {
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return true
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}
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if (host === "169.254.169.254" || host === "metadata.google.internal") {
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return true
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}
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if (
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host.endsWith(".local") ||
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host.endsWith(".internal") ||
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host.endsWith(".localhost")
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) {
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return true
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}
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// Literal IP supplied directly in the URL
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return isPrivateIp(host)
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}
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/**
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* Check if URL points to private/internal network.
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* Blocks: localhost, private IPs, link-local, AWS metadata service.
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*
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* Resolves the hostname via DNS and validates every returned address, so
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* public-looking names that map to internal IPs (e.g. "127-0-0-1.sslip.io")
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* are caught even though they pass the string-only check.
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*/
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export async function isPrivateUrl(urlString: string): Promise<boolean> {
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try {
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const url = new URL(urlString)
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const hostname = url.hostname
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// Fast path: obvious string matches and literal IPs.
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if (isPrivateHostname(hostname)) return true
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// Resolve DNS and reject if any address is private.
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const stripped = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").replace(/\.$/, "")
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const addresses = await lookup(stripped, { all: true })
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return addresses.some(({ address }) => isPrivateIp(address))
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} catch {
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return true // Invalid URL or DNS failure - block it
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}
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}
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/**
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* Whether private URLs are allowed (defaults to true)
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* Set ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=false to block private URLs
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* Read per call so admin-panel changes apply without restart
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*/
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export function allowPrivateUrls(): boolean {
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return process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS !== "false"
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}
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