Merge origin/main into features/validate-diagram-with-vlm

lib/ssrf-protection.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/**
+ * SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) protection utilities
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Check if URL points to private/internal network
+ * Blocks: localhost, private IPs, link-local, AWS metadata service
+ */
+export function isPrivateUrl(urlString: string): boolean {
+    try {
+        const url = new URL(urlString)
+        const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase()
+
+        // Block localhost
+        if (
+            hostname === "localhost" ||
+            hostname === "127.0.0.1" ||
+            hostname === "::1"
+        ) {
+            return true
+        }
+
+        // Block AWS/cloud metadata endpoints
+        if (
+            hostname === "169.254.169.254" ||
+            hostname === "metadata.google.internal"
+        ) {
+            return true
+        }
+
+        // Check for private IPv4 ranges
+        const ipv4Match = hostname.match(
+            /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/,
+        )
+        if (ipv4Match) {
+            const [, a, b] = ipv4Match.map(Number)
+            if (a === 10) return true // 10.0.0.0/8
+            if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true // 172.16.0.0/12
+            if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true // 192.168.0.0/16
+            if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true // 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local)
+            if (a === 127) return true // 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
+        }
+
+        // Block common internal hostnames
+        if (
+            hostname.endsWith(".local") ||
+            hostname.endsWith(".internal") ||
+            hostname.endsWith(".localhost")
+        ) {
+            return true
+        }
+
+        return false
+    } catch {
+        return true // Invalid URL - block it
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether private URLs are allowed (defaults to true)
+ * Set ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=false to block private URLs
+ */
+export const allowPrivateUrls = process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS !== "false"