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fix(parse-url): block SSRF via private/internal URLs (#845)
/api/parse-url accepted any URL the user submitted, fetched it via @extractus/article-extractor, and returned the body as Markdown. With ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS unset (the default after #600) the SSRF guard short-circuited entirely, so an unauthenticated POST could probe container ports, read AWS IMDS / GCP metadata, and reach same-VPC internal services. - parse-url now always rejects private URLs regardless of ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS. The flag's only legitimate use case is local LLM provider baseUrl overrides (validate-model, chat); article extraction has no business fetching internal hosts. Local LLM setups (Ollama, LM Studio, etc.) are unaffected. - Strip a trailing dot from the hostname before equality checks so the FQDN form "localhost." (which still resolves to 127.0.0.1) is caught by the existing string match. Known follow-ups (not addressed here): - DNS rebinding: hostnames are matched as strings; a public domain resolving to 127.0.0.1 (e.g. localtest.me) is not caught. - HTTP redirects: @extractus/article-extractor uses cross-fetch with default redirect: "follow" and exposes no hook, so a public URL 302-ing to an internal host still leaks.
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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import { extract } from "@extractus/article-extractor"
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import { NextResponse } from "next/server"
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import TurndownService from "turndown"
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import { allowPrivateUrls, isPrivateUrl } from "@/lib/ssrf-protection"
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import { isPrivateUrl } from "@/lib/ssrf-protection"
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const MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH = 150000 // Match PDF limit
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const EXTRACT_TIMEOUT_MS = 15000
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@@ -28,8 +28,10 @@ export async function POST(req: Request) {
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)
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}
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// SSRF protection
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if (!allowPrivateUrls && isPrivateUrl(url)) {
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// SSRF protection: parse-url has no use case for fetching internal
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// hosts, so private URLs are always rejected. ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS only
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// governs LLM provider baseUrl overrides (validate-model, chat).
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if (isPrivateUrl(url)) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: "Cannot access private/internal URLs" },
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{ status: 400 },
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