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fix: allow private URLs by default for reverse proxy setups (#600)

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* fix: allow private URLs by default for reverse proxy setups

Fixes #588 - Users with reverse proxy setups (e.g., Antigravity tools)
were getting "Invalid base URL" errors due to SSRF protection blocking
private/internal URLs.

Changes:
- Add ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS env var (defaults to true)
- Set to "false" to enable strict SSRF protection if needed

* refactor: extract isPrivateUrl to shared utility
This commit is contained in:
Dayuan Jiang
2026-01-17 23:14:53 +09:00
committed by GitHub
parent 9caf2f793e
commit 4ace31d412
4 changed files with 72 additions and 113 deletions
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54
app/api/parse-url/route.ts
View File

@@ -1,61 +1,11 @@
import { extract } from "@extractus/article-extractor"
import { NextResponse } from "next/server"
import TurndownService from "turndown"
import { allowPrivateUrls, isPrivateUrl } from "@/lib/ssrf-protection"
const MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH = 150000 // Match PDF limit
const EXTRACT_TIMEOUT_MS = 15000
// SSRF protection - block private/internal addresses
function isPrivateUrl(urlString: string): boolean {
try {
const url = new URL(urlString)
const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase()
// Block localhost
if (
hostname === "localhost" ||
hostname === "127.0.0.1" ||
hostname === "::1"
) {
return true
}
// Block AWS/cloud metadata endpoints
if (
hostname === "169.254.169.254" ||
hostname === "metadata.google.internal"
) {
return true
}
// Check for private IPv4 ranges
const ipv4Match = hostname.match(
/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/,
)
if (ipv4Match) {
const [, a, b] = ipv4Match.map(Number)
if (a === 10) return true // 10.0.0.0/8
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true // 172.16.0.0/12
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true // 192.168.0.0/16
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true // 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local)
if (a === 127) return true // 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
}
// Block common internal hostnames
if (
hostname.endsWith(".local") ||
hostname.endsWith(".internal") ||
hostname.endsWith(".localhost")
) {
return true
}
return false
} catch {
return true // Invalid URL - block it
}
}
export async function POST(req: Request) {
try {
const { url } = await req.json()
@@ -78,7 +28,7 @@ export async function POST(req: Request) {
}
// SSRF protection
if (isPrivateUrl(url)) {
if (!allowPrivateUrls && isPrivateUrl(url)) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: "Cannot access private/internal URLs" },
{ status: 400 },

63
app/api/validate-model/route.ts
View File

@@ -9,69 +9,10 @@ import { createOpenRouter } from "@openrouter/ai-sdk-provider"
import { generateText } from "ai"
import { NextResponse } from "next/server"
import { createOllama } from "ollama-ai-provider-v2"
import { allowPrivateUrls, isPrivateUrl } from "@/lib/ssrf-protection"
export const runtime = "nodejs"
/**
* SECURITY: Check if URL points to private/internal network (SSRF protection)
* Blocks: localhost, private IPs, link-local, AWS metadata service
*/
function isPrivateUrl(urlString: string): boolean {
try {
const url = new URL(urlString)
const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase()
// Block localhost
if (
hostname === "localhost" ||
hostname === "127.0.0.1" ||
hostname === "::1"
) {
return true
}
// Block AWS/cloud metadata endpoints
if (
hostname === "169.254.169.254" ||
hostname === "metadata.google.internal"
) {
return true
}
// Check for private IPv4 ranges
const ipv4Match = hostname.match(
/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/,
)
if (ipv4Match) {
const [, a, b] = ipv4Match.map(Number)
// 10.0.0.0/8
if (a === 10) return true
// 172.16.0.0/12
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true
// 192.168.0.0/16
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true
// 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local)
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true
// 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
if (a === 127) return true
}
// Block common internal hostnames
if (
hostname.endsWith(".local") ||
hostname.endsWith(".internal") ||
hostname.endsWith(".localhost")
) {
return true
}
return false
} catch {
// Invalid URL - block it
return true
}
}
interface ValidateRequest {
provider: string
apiKey: string
@@ -108,7 +49,7 @@ export async function POST(req: Request) {
}
// SECURITY: Block SSRF attacks via custom baseUrl
if (baseUrl && isPrivateUrl(baseUrl)) {
if (baseUrl && !allowPrivateUrls && isPrivateUrl(baseUrl)) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ valid: false, error: "Invalid base URL" },
{ status: 400 },