Restore authorized rule reveal, explicit full HTTP capture and retention, video task business fields, and valid payment URLs. Add opt-in credential preservation for trusted recovery, fix frontend type contracts and async races, and eliminate PostgreSQL test fixture resource leaks. Document audit coverage and successful fmt and CI-scoped Clippy checks.
Use PostgreSQL as the only database backend across runtime, schema tooling, installation, Compose, and CI. Update regression tests and reject removed drivers explicitly.
The gemini:generate_content URL hook rewrites any Antigravity endpoint to
/v1internal:generateContent, but only the same-format passthrough and the two
OpenAI decision paths ever built the matching envelope. A Claude Messages or
Gemini client therefore reached the standard family planner, picked up the
rewritten URL, and posted a bare Gemini body that upstream rejects with
"Invalid JSON payload received. Unknown name \"contents\"" -- four retries
across every account, then a 503 that names none of this.
Route the standard family through the shared v1internal builder the same way
gemini_cli already is, so the URL and the body come from one decision. The
OpenAI-image-to-Gemini path cannot carry an envelope at all, so it now skips
Antigravity candidates instead of sending a request upstream can only reject.
Also stop treating a configured proxy as locally unsupported. The execution
plan carries the proxy itself, and the generic and Vertex gates moved to
transport_proxy_is_locally_supported long ago; Antigravity kept rejecting on
proxy.is_some(), which no longer matches how the local runtime executes. A
proxy that resolves to no route still disqualifies the request, and transport
profiles stay unsupported because the v1internal payload never carries one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A local stream attempt writes its `usage` row and its `request_candidates`
slot as `pending` in `execute_execution_runtime_stream_inner`, then awaits
the provider's response headers. Everything after that point runs inside
the downstream request future, so a client disconnect drops it: the
dispatch `.await` never resumes and nothing settles either row. The stream
finalizer that already covers this only exists once upstream headers have
arrived, so the pre-first-byte window has no owner at all. Both rows stay
`pending` until the maintenance sweeper rewrites them as a 504 timeout ten
minutes later, losing the real outcome, the real latency, and the 499.
`AttemptCancellationGuard` takes that window. It is created disarmed, so
an attempt dropped before it owns any row does not grow a settlement row
it never had; it is armed as soon as the attempt owns its non-terminal
rows, and the stream wrappers disarm it the moment the attempt returns,
from where settlement belongs to the transport. On a cancelling drop it
settles the candidate slot through the same snapshot writer the `pending`
write above it uses, and the usage row through a terminal `Cancelled`
event.
The guard outlives the request future, so what it captures is retained for
the whole attempt. It therefore holds no request body: the plan carries the
provider request body and the report context carries the client request
body, and keeping both would double the request-body residency of every
in-flight stream attempt to serve a path that almost never runs. Simply
omitting them is not safe either, because a terminal write is
body-capture-authoritative: with both absent the seed carries the typed
`none` marker, which clears the stored capture rather than leaving it
alone. `build_usage_event_data_seed_describing_request_bodies` is the third
option -- it derives every capture state, body reference, request type and
derived request fact from the real plan and report context, and leaves out
only the two body values -- so the guard's snapshot is small and its
terminal write preserves the capture the `pending` write recorded.
The stream candidate first-byte watchdog also drops the attempt future, but
it settles the attempt itself through `build_transport_error_stop_response`.
It now marks the attempt abandoned before returning so the guard stands down
instead of racing a 499 against the watchdog's 504.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Consolidate subscription usage policy enforcement, privacy-safe persistence, and gateway security hardening into one reviewable change.
Includes bounded HTTP and execution envelopes, header and protocol guards, DNS and relay validation, authentication and secret projection hardening, secure backup/install paths, and regression coverage.
elky