feat(security): harden gateway boundaries and usage policies

Consolidate subscription usage policy enforcement, privacy-safe persistence, and gateway security hardening into one reviewable change.

Includes bounded HTTP and execution envelopes, header and protocol guards, DNS and relay validation, authentication and secret projection hardening, secure backup/install paths, and regression coverage.
This commit is contained in:
elky
2026-09-04 03:45:52 +08:00
parent ddcbeb3ae9
commit 579f2c7cc1
1019 changed files with 190437 additions and 26080 deletions
@@ -77,9 +77,9 @@ pub(crate) fn gateway_frontdoor_self_loop_guard_error_with_port(
url: &str,
) -> Option<String> {
gateway_frontdoor_self_loop_guard_matches_with_port(app_port, url).then(|| {
format!(
"upstream execution target resolves back to the local aether-gateway frontdoor: {url}"
)
// Do not echo the configured target: provider URLs can carry API keys,
// signed query parameters, or proxy credentials.
"upstream execution target resolves back to the local aether-gateway frontdoor".to_string()
})
}
@@ -143,7 +143,28 @@ fn normalize_host_for_frontdoor_loop_guard(host: &str) -> String {
}
fn is_loopbackish_host(host: &str) -> bool {
matches!(host, "localhost" | "127.0.0.1" | "::1" | "0.0.0.0" | "::")
if host.eq_ignore_ascii_case("localhost") {
return true;
}
// The execution URL validator deliberately permits literal loopback HTTP
// targets for local providers. The frontdoor loop guard must therefore
// use IP semantics instead of a short allowlist: every address in
// 127.0.0.0/8 can reach a listener bound to 0.0.0.0, and IPv4-mapped
// IPv6 forms can represent the same destinations.
let Ok(address) = host.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>() else {
return false;
};
match address {
std::net::IpAddr::V4(address) => address.is_loopback() || address.is_unspecified(),
std::net::IpAddr::V6(address) => {
address.is_loopback()
|| address.is_unspecified()
|| address
.to_ipv4()
.is_some_and(|mapped| mapped.is_loopback() || mapped.is_unspecified())
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]